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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
April 12, 1985 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 2 
No. 84-1097-cfx 
GOLDMAN (Air Force chaplain) 
v. 
WEINBERGER (Sec'y of Defense) 
Cert to ~oc ~ 
v/ (Mikva, Edwards, & Swygert 
[CA7) ) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that his First Amendment 
rights were violated by an Air Force regulation prohibiting him 
' 
L (_ / \...l. 




2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Petr, an ordained rabbi, ____.._.., 
is an Orthodox Jew who has since childhood observed certain Jew-
ish traditions and laws including keeping his head covered at all 
times. Between 1970 and 1972, he was a chaplain in the u.s. 
~
Navy, where he wore a yarmulke while in uniform without incident. 
In 1973, he was admitted into the Armed Forces Health Professions 
Scholarship Program, where he completed a PhD in clinical psy-
--......_______~
chology in exchg_~e for a later commitment to serve on active 
~
duty in the armed services. In 1977 petr entered active service 
~~
as a captain and was assigned to the Mental Health Clinic of the 
Air Force Regional Hospital at March Air Force Base. Between 
September 1977 and May 8, 1981, he wore a yarmulke at all times ,____..._____ 
while on duty at March without incident. Throughout his service 
he received consistently outstanding evaluations from his superi-
ors, including in the category "Professional qualities," which 
included attitude, dress, cooperation, and bearing. 
On May 8, 1981, petr was told by the hospital commander 
that wearing a yarmulke while in uniform violated Air Force regu-
lations 35-10, which specifies proper uniform wear under all cir-
cumstances, and which requires that "headgear will not be worn . 
• • while indoors except by armed security personnel in the per-
formance of their duties." Petr was ordered to cease wearing the 
yarmulke indoors at all places on the base except the hospital, 
noting that disobedience could subject him to court-martial. 
Petr's request that he be allowed to continue wearing the yarmul-
ke for religious reasons was denied, and the c'qmmander subse-
i quently ordered petr to cease wearing the yarmulke anywhere on 
the base. Petr refused, and processing of a formal reprimand 
began. The commander also withdrew a recommendation to grant 
petr's request to extend the term of his active service, and sub-
stituted a recommendation that the request be denied. 
Petr filed this suit, challenging the regulation on 
MFirst Amendment grounds. The DC granted a TRO and a preliminary 
injunction against enforcement of the regulation. After a hear-
/ 
ing, the~C granted a permanent injunction. ~ADC reversed, rul-________.. 
ing that the question was whether "the restrictions on [petr 's) 
right to exercise his religion were authorized and justified by 
the power of the military to regulate itself, giving due weight 
to each of the conflicting interests." It concluded that the Air 
Force's interest in uniformity and in enforcing such uniformity 
~ -----
strictly to enhance discipline was entitled to deference. Al-
though it conceded petr raised "serious questions concerning the 
restrictiveness of the Air Force's regulations and the manner of 
their enforcement," it found the specialized military nature of 
the rules and the reason for their enforcement to be a "suffi-
cient answer." 
Judges Starr, Ginsburg, and Scalia dissented from the 
denial of a petn for rehearing en bane. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that CADC has sanctioned 
a direct governmental restraint on a serviceman's free exercise 
of his religion for no reason other than the Air Force's interest 
in uniformity. The decision conflicts with decisions by this 
·-~ ... , 
Court holding that deference to military authority is not abso-, 
• 
lute when individual constitutional rights are invblved, and with 
decisions requiring reasonable accommodation of the free exercise 
of religious beliefs. CADC failed to require the Air Force to 
use the least restrictive means and failed to heed the admonition 
of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 u.s. 398, 406 (1963), that "[o]nly the 
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion 
for permissible 1 imitation." This case presents an even more 
compelling Free Exercise claim than the other religion cases 
heard by the~rt this Term. 
The SG responds that this Court has long recognized that 
the different character of the military requires a different ap-
protections. "The fundamental neces-
sity for obedience and the consequent necessity for imposition of 
discipline, may render permissible within the military that which 
would be impermissible outside it." Par k e r v . Levy , 41 7 U • S . 
733, 758 (1974). CADC properly applied this principle. More-
over, in the First Amendment cases cited by petr, there was no 
significant governmental interest in uniformity of application, 
as there is in the military. Thus, those cases are inapposite. 
Even the DC did not find petr had a substantive First Amendment 
right to a religious exception to the Air Force regulations; 
rather, it based its decision on the fact that the regulations 
were insufficiently supported by clinical or other studies. The 
military, however, need not present clinical proof of the wisdom 
of its regulations. Rather, this Court has held that deference 
must be given to military expertise in the area of discipline • 
... .. 
The SG also contends that petr ultimate!~ does not chal-
1 
lenge the legal standard applied by CADC, but challenges the jus-
tification for the Air Force rule as a factual matter. Petr re-
peatedly speaks of how his practice of wearing a yarmulke had 
caused no disruptio~ and claims there is no rational basis for 
the Air Force regulation. 
Finally, the SG points to other reasons why cert should 
be denied. A reversal of the decision below would have no prac-
tical effect on petr because he is no longer on active duty. 
Moreover, the regulations at issue are now under study for ways 
to minimize the potential conflict between the regulations and 
the religious beliefs of servicemen. The report of the study 
group is expected to be completed by mid April of this year. Ac-
commodation by the political branches, rather than being required 
by the courts, is the preferable way of resolving this issue. 
4. DISCUSSION: The conflict between free exercise 
rights and the usual deference due military regulations poses an 
interesting question. Petrs have identified no square conflict 
with any of this Court's cases, however, and CADC appears to have 
correctly noted how great this Court's deference to the 
military's need for uniformity and discipline has been. This is 
a sympathetic case for petr on its facts, yet I am not convinced 
--- -------------that any certworthy question is presented. The Court plans to 
refuse 'tC> grant an exemption from the requirement that persons 
have pictures on their drivers • licenses in Jensen v. Quar ing, 
No • 8 3 -19 4 4 . If the State's burden there outweighs the individ-
ual's bona fide religious interest in not having her picture on 
the license, it is hard to imagine 
outweigh the military 1 s established 
that petr 1 S 1 interest would 
·': i 
interest in ''luniformi ty and 
discipline here. Thus, a hold for Jensen would not seem to serve 
much purpose. Moreover, as the SG notes, attempts are now being 
made to revise the regulations to accommodate religious beliefs 
of the sort petr holds. Although 1 consider it a close case, I 
tentatively recommend denial. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: 1 recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
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ABSENT NOT YOTING 
G D 
lfp/ss 12/31/85 GOLDMAN SALLY-POW 
84-1097 Goldman v. Weinberger (CADC) 
(January 14 Argument) 
MEMO TO MIKE: 
The question is the validity of an Air Force 
regulation that prohibited an Orthodox Jewish psychologist 
from wearing a "yarmulke" - an unobstrusive skull cap -
while he is in uniform on duty at a military hospital? 
Petitioner's military service is relevant though 
certainly not conclusive. He served as a chaplain in the 
Navy from 1970-1972, and wore his yarmulke without 
incident. When he decided to go to graduate school and 
study clinical psychology, he applied for and accepted an 
Armed Forces scholarship, was placed on inactive reserve 
status while he studied for three years, and received "a 
monthly stipend and an allowance for tuition, books and 
fees." He was then required to serve a minimum of one 
year of active duty for each year of subsidized education. 
After receiving his Ph.D. in clinical psychology, 
petitioner was assigned to active duty at March Air Force 
Base regional hospital. He continued wearing a yarmulke 
while indoors, and while on duty at the hospital. 
'\.._____/' 
. \• .. 
Not surprisingly, Air Force regulations like 
those in the other services - require: 
"Air Force members will wear the Air Force 
uniform while performing their military duties 
(and with exceptions not relevant to this case) 
head gear will not be worn while indoors." AFR 
35-10 ~~ 1-6 and l-6.h(2) 




"The Air Force is a uniformed service" and 
"uniform wear greatly enhances the esPrit de 
corps essential to an effective military force." 
When petitioner returned to active duty, in 1977, 
a "low profile", and wearing his yarmulke was not 
seriously challenged. The then commander simply decided 
not to confront the issue. In 1981 when petitioner 
testified as a witness at a court martial hearing, and was 
wearing a yarmulke with his Air Force uniform - the trial 
counsel made a formal objection. The hospital commander 
advised petitioner that he was in violation of Air Force 
regulations. The commander sought a mutually acceptable 
accommodation by agreeing that petitioner could wear his 
yarmulke when he was in the hospital, but that he would 
have to conform to uniform requirements in any of the 
'---) 
' . ,. 
I I 
l 
other buildings on the base. Petitioner rejected this 
proposed accommodation, and informed the commander that he 
would continue to wear his yarmulke whenever he saw fit. 
The commander issued a formal order, and petitioner 
instituted this suit. 
~ 
The District Court, after a trial on the merits, 
agreed generally as to the purposes of the Air Force 
regulations, but nevertheless concluded that the 
regulations were invalid. Permitting religious 
exceptions, in the opinion of the DC, would make the Air 
Force a "more humane institution" (a curious perception of 
a military force). The DC entered a permanent injunction 
in favor of petitioner. But CADC reversed in an opinion 
by Judge Swygert, joined by Judges Mikva and Edwards. 
Upon en bane suggestion, only three judges favored it -
including Judge Starr who wrote a rather persuasive 
dissent in which he found that the regulations violated 
the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. 
At least tentatively, this seems to be an easy 
case. Perhaps I should disqualify myself in view of 
having served four years in Air Force, and additional 
years in the inactive reserve. But all of these years 
were "a long time ago". Several other members of the 
Court had military service, and we have sat in other 
military cases. In any event, as I am quite familiar with 
the arguments pro and con, I wi 11 not summarize them in 
this memo beyond the briefest statement. 
Petitioner's well written brief (by Nathan 
Lewin) argues correctly that a person in service continues 
to have constitutional rights. One of these rights is 
that of "private religious observance". Petitioner relies 
on the Record in this case as proving that the reasons 
assigned by the Air Force for its uniform regulations are 
insubstantial. Moreover, petitioner would apply the 
"compelling government interest n standard, requiring the -----~} ----Ai'r Force to use "the restrictive means" to serve its 
stated purposes of requiring complete uniformity as to 
what should be worn and not worn. Petitioner's brief 
attacks what is characterized as the new and unprecedented 
"piogrammatic interest" standard. It is not clear to me 
exactly what standard the SG relies upon, nor am I 
entirely clear as to what "programmatic" means. 1 
Petitioner also argues that religious exemptions would be 
desirable in the Armed Services, and that the reasons 
1 What does this word mean? 
SG brief. 
It is overused in recent 
I 
:1 
relied on by the Air Force are merely opinions 
unsubstantiated by any testimony. 
I find the SG's brief more persuasive. As our 
cases have recognized the military is a separate community 
"without counterpart in civilian life". Schlesinger v. 
Councilman, 420 u.s., at 757: see also Brown v. Glines, 
444 u.s. 248: and Perker v. Levy, 417 u.s. 733. The SG 
notes that we have "not yet attached a label to the 
standard of review" in military cases (see ~rown v. 
The SG further states that this Court has 
engaged in "no balancing, no weighing of interest", in 
concluding that "speech likely to interfere with the vital 
military prerequisites of loyalty, morale and discipline 
for military effectiveness can be excluded from a 
military base". 444 U.S., at 354 (my quote here is not 
verbatim) . 
In Greer v. Spock, 424 u.s., at 843-844, I noted 
in my concurring opinion that unlike civilian society, a 
"military organization is not constructed along democratic 
lines and military activities cannot be governed by 
democratic procedures II Members of the military 
necessarily must obey orders without question or 
/ 
•', 
hesitation, even when these orders may severely compromise 
a soldier's personal safety or comfort. 
Our cases also have emphasized that in view of 
the special nature of military service, courts must accord 
great deference to professional military judgments. See 
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 u.s. 196, 300-301; and Orloff v. 
Willoughby, 345 u.s. 83, 93-94. 
The SG states, correctly I believe, that 
uniformity in dress serves to inculcate discipline, 
morale, and espirit de corps, and that "virtually all 
professional military personnel, by centuries of military 
experience in this and other countries, by civilian social 
scientists, and by common sense" agree. The SG also 
states that "petitioner conceded as much in the Court of 
Appeals, and he has not argued otherwise in this Court". 
See, SG's brief p. 18. This should be checked. 
I add one further point that may not be 
adequately emphasized. If one exception is made to the 
application of a concededly valid military regulation of 
general application, it would not be easy to draw a line. 
In addition to free exercise of religion cases, there 
would be free speech cases, and perhaps others. 
, '. 
·' ' 
Finally, the SG places a good deal of emphasis on 
a Joint Service Study Group report. See, pp. 11-15 of the 
SG's brief, including what appear to be the unanimous 
conclusions reached by this study. 
I would still welcome a brief bobtail bench memo, 





To: Mr. Justice Powell January 10, 1986 
From: Mike 
No. 84-1907 Goldman v. Weinberger ( c:A () L.) 
Cert. to the CADC Set for Argument Jan. 14 
Date: Jan. 10, 1986 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether the Free Exercise Clause requires to Air Force 
to make an exception to its detailed uniform regulations to per-
mit an Orthodox Jewish officer to wear a yarmulke while on active 
duty. 
!. FACTS 
Your file memo already outlines the facts necessary to 
decision; 1 will only summarize them. Petr is an Orthodox Jewish 
.... ' '. 
page 2. 
officer. For purposes of this case, I think it mus ~ be accepted 
l'f 
that his religion requires him to keep his head covered at all 
times. He was, during the relevant time period, a psychologist 
~
at an Air Force base in California. When outdoors, petr wears 
the prescribed military headgear. When he is indoors, he wears 
the yarmulke, commonly called a ~ullca~ (although 1 believe Or-
thodox Jews prefer that it be called by its Hebrew name). Prior 
to studying psychology, petr wore the yarmulke for several years 
in the Navy. The government suggests that he was able to do this 
because of a now-discredited memo from Chief of Naval Operations 
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt. Petr also wore his yarmulke during his 
tour of duty with the Air Force for many months without serious 
incident, although not without comment. While testifying for the 
defense in a court-martial, the prosecutor registered a formal 
objection concerning the yarmulke, presumably because of the 
added credibility that symbol of devout religiosity gave to 
petr's testimony. The commander offered to allow petr to wear 
the yarmulke in the hospital, so that he only would have to go 
uncovered when he was indoors elsewhere on the base. Petr re-
jected that compromise, and continued to wear the yarmulke, in 
~ 
violation of a written order to him from the commander. He was 
issued a letter of reprimand for "flouting of military authority" 
and the commander also withdrew a previously-issued recommenda-
tion that petr's tour of active duty be extended. 
Petr then filed suit in the u.s.o.c. for the District of 
Columbia, challenging the application of Air Force Regulation 
(AFR) 35-10 (the headgear regulation) on Free Exercise grounds 
page 3. 
and seeking damages and injunctive relief. The di~ trict court 
granted a TRO and later a preliminary injunction. After trial, 
the DC entered a permanent injunction against the Air Force, rea-
soning that the AFR was not supported by any empirical evidence 
or psychological study and the making exceptions for unobtrusive 
religious practices would serve to "dissipate hostility" and make 
the Air Force a "more humane institution." As you pointed out, 
language like that is the best argument against judicial review 
of military decisionmaking. • 
The court of appeals (CADC) reversed. Perhaps I should 
not focus on this, but for me one of the most telling facts in 
this entire case is that the CADC panel that reversed and upheld 
the regulation consisted of Judges Mikva, Edwards, and Swygert 
(senior circuit judge for the CA 7) • If Abner Mikva thinks this 
regulation ought to be upheld, that is very persuasiv~ r~ ~~ ~ ~--<...-.. 
II. ANALYSIS 1 ~~4_ ~ 
None of the courts below stated any particular standard ~ 
~~-~~ 
of review. The SG correctly notes that no exact label has been 
given to the proper standard of review in military cases. I am 
not persuaded that any particular set phrase to describe a stand-
ard of review would be all that helpful. The Court's experience 
with labels in the Equal Protection cases teaches that these la-
bels can actually serve to divide judges who are in general 
agreement. I will therefore try to describe the standard of re-
view without locking into a set phrase. 
It can be accepted at the outset that the standard of 
review of military decisions ought to be the most deferential of 
page 4. 
all judicial standards of review. No decisionmaker':; is entitled 
to greater deference than the military. Therefore, whatever the 
' ---------
standard of review is, U must'strow greater deference than "a 
reasonable basis in the record" (administrative agencies) or 
"such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to 
demonstrate that the faculty did not exercise professional judg-
ment" (academic decisions--see Ewing). The judgment of the mili-
tary command concerning the proper operation of the military is 
entitled to greater deference than the judgment of a university 
faculty concerning admissions. 
As a first step in setting a standard of review, it is 
now well-established that even constitutional rights are applied 
·n the military. "While members of the military are 
not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, 
the different character of the military community and of the mil-
itary mission requires a different application of those protec-
tions." <arker v. Levy, 417 u.s. at 758. 1 do not think that 
the Court's oft repeated assertions that individual liberties are 
not in full operation in the military means only that there are 
slight differences: 1 think 
precedent, is free to require 
son's individual liberties. 
the military, under this Court's l 
substantial curtailment of a per- \ 
The second point is that this Court frequently has re-
fer red to its own lack of competence in the area of military 
judgment. See, ~' Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 u.s. 1, 10 (1973): 
"[1]t is difficult to conceive of an area of government activity 
in which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, 
.• 
page 5. 
and professional decisions as to the compositiorl, 
'I 
training, 
equipping, and control of a military force are essentially pro-
fessional military judgments." I might add that the reason that 
courts lack the competence to review military decisions is that 
those decisions are permitted to be completely anti-democratic. 
Judges are trained to review government under standards and doc-
trines (such as due process) that ensure a democratic government. 
They are accustomed to requiring that the government act in a way 
that does not unduly intrude on individual liberty. That train-
ing simply is not transferrable to review of military decisions. 
As a final predicate to setting up a standard of review, 
I note that professional military decisions are entitled to be 
supported by E ,;;; ~ What l mean by that is that 
petr's arguments that focus on a lack of sociological or psycho-
logical support for the uniform regulations are misplaced. The 
military is entitled to rely on its own institutional experience 
and studies to support its decisions. That institutional experi-
ence has been refined over a greater period of time, subject to 
much more demanding tests (i.e., the rigors of war) and is enti-
tled to at least as much, if not more, credibility than the stud-
ies and opinions of individual psychologists. 
The v;;; has selected the case that best typifies the 
proper standard of review,v13rown v. Glines, 444 u.s. 348 (1980). - -----In that case, the Air Force regulation forbade the circulation of 
petitions by soldiers on a military base without approval of the 
base commander, who was authorized to suppress the distribution 
of material that he judged would endanger the loyalty, disci-
·'· I 
page 6. 
pline, or morale of members of the Armed Forces. T~e regulation 
l 
had been enforced against a soldier who had solicited signatures 
on petitions to congressmen, complaining about the Air Force's 
grooming standards. The court of appeals invalidated the regula-
tion as overbroad. 
This Court reversed. The Court recognized that "loyal-
ty, morale, and discipline are essential attributes of all mili-
tary service" and held simply that "speech likely to interfere 
with these vital prerequisites for military effectiveness there-
fore can be excluded," 444 u.s. 357 n. 14, adding only that the 
regulation of such expression must "restrict speech no more than 
is reasonably necessary to protect the substantial government 
interest," id., at 355. 
The result of Glines is that if the military can demon-
strate that a breach of the regulation at issue is likely to in-
terfere with some important aspect of military effectiveness, the 
regulation will be sustained so long as it is no more restrictive 
of the constitutional right in issue than is reasonably necessary 
to protect the military interest. I will examine the latter as-
pect of that standard of review first. 
I think it is clear that the regulation in issue here is 
no more restrictive than is reasonably necessary to protect the 
interest involved. The military interest involved is in complete 
uniformit That in turn is related to its 
very substantial interest, as described in the SG 's brief, in 
inculcating a group mentality in which each soldier's sense of 
individuality and "distinctness" from other soldiers is greatly 
page 7. 
I 
reduced. While that notion may seem foreign to dem4cratic 
ety, 1 accept the fact that it is essential to an eff~ctive 
soci-
mili-
tary. In order to protect that interest, the regulation at issue 
prescribes in detail the uniform requirements. However, it al-
lows for those exceptions not necessary to the purpose--
specifically, those personal i terns of clothing or jewelry that 
are both unobtrusive and worn under the uniform, so that the 
sense of uniformity is not broken. In addition, the regulation 
allows for medical exceptions. In that way, the regulation re-
quires no more than is necessary to the accomplishment of the 
purpose. 
The ~tion is whether any exception to the 
regulation is li~ly to have an adverse impact on some aspect of 
military effectiveness. lt is here that we get into the meaning 
of the ubiquitous word "programma ic." The petr argues that all 
the Court must consider is whether allowing him to wear his yar-
mulke would hinder accomplishment of the military objective. He 
is able to demonstrate that the military's case against this one ,.... 
exception is not very strong, although petr himself does not make 
a strong showing that an exception for him would not be disrup-
tive--he appears to assume that the burden is on the military to 
show that its regulation is valid. I am not sure that is a valid 
assumption. The military, on the other hand, argues that it must 
be allowed to take into account its "programmatic" concerns--that 
is, concerns that go to the entire program or system of requiring 
certain uniforms. ..-------...__- Instead of only looking at the effect of an 





military, it must be allowed to frame the issue '!'in terms of 
1'1 
whether, in general, allowing exceptions to uniform military 
dress requirements would be disruptive. 
Petr's argument in response is that Free Exercise cases 
always have examined the effect of the challenged law on the par-
ticular individual. That is true, but beside the point. First, 
non-military have greatly reduced precedential value in a mili-
tary case. Second, in this case the very interest involved is in 
uniformity--in not making exceptions. This is in contrast to 
other Free Exercise cases where the law has an independent pur-
pose, and the Court examines whether an exception would somehow 
defeat that purpose. When the very purpose of the law is to re-
quire that everyone dress exactly the same as others of their 
rank, ~exception defeats that purpose. The SG's "programmat-
ic" argument is mistaken as a general principle of Free Exercise 
analysis, but in this case it fits the facts neatly. 
On these facts, then, the military has demonstrated that 
an exception for petr would be likely to interfere with military 
effectiveness, by defeating the military's admittedly valid in-
terest in complete outward uniformity of its troops. The mili-
~---------------~--------------------, 
tary is entitled to rely on the probable effects not only of an 
exception for petr, but on exceptions in general. In fact, I 
think they adequately prove their case just by showing the likely 
effects of an exception for all Orthodox Jews. Petr complains 
that the government has made no showing that exceptions would be 
disruptive. In one sense, that is similar to the argument in 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres that the City of Renton had made no 
".~· . . ' 
page 9. 
concrete showing of a bad effect of adult theatres iti the City of 
l 
Renton itself. But it is very difficult to establish the harmful 
Similarly, it is 
very difficult for the military to (concre~ prov~~ that excep-
tions to the dress code woud be disruptive, since there are no 
exceptions. It has pointed to temporary lapses (the Kitty Hawk), 
and to experimental exceptions that have since been abandoned 
(beards for Sikhs) . to the That is a sufficient showing. The 
military also has made a plausible case that it could not avoid 
making other exceptions, once it allowed an exception for petr. 
It put into evidence files it has of requested exceptions that 
presumably would have to be granted if an exception is made for 
petr. Experience with any first exception to a general rule dem-
onstrates the validity of that concern. 
111. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, 1 recommend affirming the CADC and 
upholding the validity of the challenged regulation. 
I r::;---
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From: Justice Rehnquist 
Circulated: FEB 14 1986 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1097 
S. SIMCHA GOLDMAN, PETITIONER v. CASPAR W. 
WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1986] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
PetitionerS. Simcha Goldman contends that the Free Ex-
ercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution permits him to wear a yarmulke while in uni-
form, notwithstanding an Air Force regulation mandating 
uniform dress for Air Force personnel. The District Court 
for the District of Columbia permanently enjoined the Air 
Force from enforcing its regulation against petitioner and 
from penalizing him for wearing his yarmulke. The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed on the 
ground that the Air Force's strong interest in discipline justi-
fied the strict enforcement of its uniform dress requirements. 
We granted certiorari because of the importance of the ques-
tion, and now affirm. 
Petitioner Goldman is an Orthodox Jew and ordained 
rabbi. In 1973, he was accepted into the Armed Forces 
Health Professions Scholarship Program and placed on inac-
tive reserve status in the Air Force while he studied clinical 
psychology at Loyola University of Chicago. · During his 
three years in the scholarship program, he received a 
monthly stipend and an allowance for tuition, books, and 
fees. After completing his Ph.D. in psychology, petitioner 
entered active service in the United States Air Force as a 
commissioned officer, in accordance with a requirement that 
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one year of active duty for each year of subsidized education. 
Petitioner was stationed at March Air Force Base in River-
side, California, and served as a clinical psychologist at the 
mental health clinic on the base. 
Until1981, petitioner was not prevented from wearing his 
yarmulke on the base. He avoided controversy by remain-
ing close to his duty station in the health clinic and by wear-
ing his service cap over the yarmulke when out of doors. 
But in April1981, after he testified as a defense witness at a 
court-martial wearing his yarmulke but not his service cap, 
opposing counsel lodged a complaint with Colonel Joseph 
Gregory, the Hospital Commander, arguing that petitioner's 
practice of wearing his yarmulke was a violation of Air Force 
Regulation (AFR) 35-10. This regulation states in pertinent 
part that "[h]eadgear will not be worn ... [w]hile indoors ex-
cept by armed security police in the performance of their du-
ties." AFR 35-10, ~ 1-6.h(2)(f). 
Colonel Gregory informed petitioner that wearing a yar-
mulke while on duty does indeed violate AFR 35-10, and or-
dered him not to violate this regulation outside the hospital. 
Although virtually all of petitioner's time on the base was 
spent in the hospital, he refused. Later, after petitioner's 
attorney protested to the Air Force General Counsel, Colonel 
Gregory revised his order to prohibit petitioner from wearing 
the yarmulke even in the hospital. Petitioner's request to 
report for duty in civilian clothing pending legal resolution of 
the issue was denied. The next day he received a formal let-
ter of reprimand, and was warned that failure to obey AFR 
35-10 could subject him to a court-martial. Colonel Gregory 
also withdrew a recommendation that petitioner's application 
to extend the term of his active service be approved, and sub-
stituted a negative recommendation. 
Petitioner then sued respondent Secretary of Defense and 
others, claiming that the application of AFR 35-10 to prevent 
him from wearing his Yarmulke infringed upon his First 
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United States District Court for the District of Columbia pre-
liminarily enjoined the enforcement of the regulation, 530 F. 
Supp. 12 (1981), and then after a full hearing permanently en-
joined the Air Force from prohibiting petitioner from wear-
ing a yarmulke while in uniform. Respondent appealed to 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
which reversed. 734 F. 2d 1531 (1984). As an initial mat-
ter, the Court of Appeals determined that the appropriate 
level of scrutiny of a military regulation that clashes with a 
constitutional right is neither strict scrutiny nor rational 
basis. Id., at 1535-1536. Instead, it held that a military 
regulation must be examined to determine whether "legiti-
mate military ends are sought to be achieved," id., at 1536, 
and whether it is "designed to accommodate the individual 
right to an appropriate degree." Ibid. Applying this test, 
the court concluded that "the Air Force's interest in uniform-
ity renders the strict enforcement of its regulation permissi-
ble." I d., at 1540. The full Court of Appeals denied a peti-
tion for rehearing en bane, with three judges dissenting. 
739 F. 2d 657 (1984). 
Petitioner argues that AFR 35-10, as applied to him, pro-
hibits religiously motivated conduct and should therefore be 
analyzed under the standard enunciated in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U. S. 398, 406 (1963). See also Thomas v. Review 
Board, 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S . 
205 (1972). But we have repeatedly held that "the military 
is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian 
society." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 743 (1974). See 
also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 300 (1983); Schle-
singer v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, 757 (1975); Orloff v. 
Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 94 (1953). "[T]he military must 
insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without coun-
terpart in civilian life," Schlesinger v. Councilman, supra, at 
757, in order to prepare for and perform its vital role. See 
also Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 354 (1980). 
I I 
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Our review of military regulations challenged on First 
Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitu-
tional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civil-
ian society. The military need not encourage debate or tol-
erate protest to the extent that such tolerance is required of 
the civilian state by the First Amendment; to accomplish its 
mission the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, 
commitment, and esprit de corps. See, e. g., Chappell v. 
Wallace, supra, at 300; Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 
843-844 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring); Parker v. Levy, 
supra, at 744. The essence of military service "is the subor-
dination of the desires and interests of the individual to the 
needs of the service." Orloff v. Willoughby, supra, at 92. 
These aspects of military life do not, of course, render en-
tirely nugatory in the military context the guarantees of the 
First Amendment. See, e. g., Chappell v. Wallace, supra, 
at 304. But "within the military community there is simply 
not the same [individual] autonomy as there is in the larger 
civilian community." Parker v. Levy, supra, at 751. In the 
context of the present case, when evaluating whether mili-
tary needs justify a particular restriction on religiously moti-
vated conduct, courts must give great deference to the pro-
fessional judgment of military authorities concerning the 
relative importance of a particular military interest. See 
Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 305; Orloff v. Willoughby, 
supra, 93-94. Not only are courts "'ill-equipped to deter-
mine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion 
upon military authority may have,"' Chappell v. Wallace, 
supra, at 305, quoting Warren, The Bill of Rights and the 
Military, 37 N. Y.U. L. Rev. 181, 187 (1962), but the military 
authorities have been charged by the Executive and Legisla-
tive branches with carrying out our Nation's military policy. 
"Judicial deference ... is at its apogee when legislative ac-
tion under the congressional authority to raise and support 
our armies and make rules and regulations for their gover-
·, 
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nance is challenged." Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 70 
(1981). 
The considered professional judgment of the Air Force is 
that the traditional outfitting of personnel in standardized 
uniforms encourages the subordination of personal prefer-
ences and identities in favor of the overall group mission. 
Uniforms encourage a sense of hierarchical unity by tending 
to eliminate outward individual distinctions except for those 
of rank. The Air Force considers them as vital during 
peacetime as during war because its personnel must be ready 
to provide an effective defense on a moment's notice; the nec-
essary habits of discipline and unity must be developed in ad-
vance of trouble. We have acknowledged that "[t]he ines-
capable demands of military discipline and obedience to 
orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of immedi-
ate compliance with military procedure and orders must be 
virtually reflex with no time for debate or reflection." 
Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 300. 
To this end, the Air Force promulgated AFR 35-10, a 190-
page document, which states that "Air Force members 
[must] wear the Air Force uniform while performing their 
military duties, except when authorized to wear civilian 
clothes on duty." AFR § 35-10, ~ 1-6. The rest of the docu-
ment describes in minute detail all of the various items of ap-
parel that must be worn as part of the Air Force uniform. It 
authorizes a few individualized options with respect to cer-
tain pieces of jewelry and hair style, but even these are sub-
ject to severe limitations. See AFR 35-10, Table 1-1, line 
16, and ~ 1-12. b(1)(b). In general, authorized headgear may 
be worn only out of doors. See AFR § 35-10, ~ 1-6.h. In-
doors, "[h]eadgear [may] not be worn ... except by armed 
security police in the performance of their duties." AFR 
35-10, ~ 1-6.h(2)(f). A narrow exception to this rule exists 
for headgear worn during indoor religious ceremonies. See 
AFR 35-10, ~ 1-6.h(2)(d). In addition, military commanders 
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other such apparel in designated living quarters and non-visi-
ble items generally. See Department of Defense Directive 
1300.17 (June 18, 1985). 
Petitioner Goldman contends that the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment requires the Air Force to 
make an exception to its uniform dress requirements for reli-
gious apparel unless the accoutrements create a "clear dan-
ger" of undermining discipline and esprit de corps. He as-
serts that in general, visible but "unobtrusive" apparel will 
not create such a danger and must therefore be accommo-
dated. He argues that the Air Force failed to prove that a 
specific exception for his practice of wearing an unobtrusive 
yarmulke would threaten discipline. He contends that the 
Air Force's assertion to the contrary is mere ipse dixit, with 
no support from actual experience or a scientific study in the 
record, and is contradicted by expert testimony that religious 
exceptions to AFR 35-10 are in fact desirable and will in-
crease morale by making the Air Force a more humane place. 
But whether or not expert witnesses may feel that reli-
gious exceptions to AFR 35-10 are desirable, and would in-
crease morale by making the Air Force a more "humane" 
place, is quite beside the point. The desirability of dress 
regulations in the military is decided by the appropriate mili-
tary officials, and they are under no constitutional mandate in 
making their decision to attempt to make the Air Force a 
more "humane" place. Quite obviously, to the extent the 
regulations permit the wearing of religious apparel such as a 
yarmulke, a practice described by petitioner as silent devo-
tion akin to prayer, military life may be more pleasant for pe-
titioner and probably others. But nothing in the First 
Amendment requires the military to accommodate such idio-
syncrasies in the face of its view that they would detract from 
the uniformity sought by the dress regulations. The Air 
Force has drawn the line essentially between religious ap-
parel which is visible and that which is not, and we hold that 
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and evenhandedly regulate dress in the interest of the mili-
tary's perceived need for uniformity. The First Amendment 
therefore does not prohibit them from being applied to peti-
tioner even though their effect is to restrict in a modest way 
his desire to wear the headgear required by his religious 
beliefs. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
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